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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Such a statute would have the effect of greater compliance with
the spirit of Internationtal Shoe. s
Any major step toward a completely integrated test for juris-
diction must presumably come from the Supreme Court. It seems
to be time for a whole reappraisal of the doctrine of quasi in rem
jurisdiction.8 9 Property should be considered as one of the con-
tacts in determining whether to exercise in personam jurisdiction."
It is certainly arguable that practically, this is what occurs today
in states with provisions similar to 320(c). If the property is
of any value the defendant "consents" to jurisdiction. A test
based on the modern interests analysis would analyze such factors
as the value of the property, whether it was income producing
and whether it was in the forum through the voluntary choice of the
owner.9' With the contact thus established analysis would proceed
to forum non conveniens or forum conveniens considerations.9 2
In the absence of a complete overhaul of quasi in rem juris-
diction, perhaps a commendable step can be taken in that direction
by abolishing the practice that carries the doctrine to its conceptual
pinnacle-garnishment of intangibles-by laying Harris v. Balk
to rest alongside of Pennoyer v. Neff.
GROUP LEGAL SERVIcEs: THE ETHICAL TRADITIONS
AND THE CONSTITUTION
The law is in constant change. As the needs of the people
develop, the law must necessarily respond with appropriate meas-
ures to satisfy those needs and to secure their enjoyment. This
then is the simple formula for the development of law: public need
and judicial or legislative response.
88 Judge Learned Hand has emphasized that the issue of whether juris-
diction may be exercised under the International Shoe test is "certainly
indistinguishable from the issue of 'forum non conveniens'." Kilpatrick v.
Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788, 790-91 (2d Cir. 1948). See also Latimer
v. S/A Industries Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1949).
89 See Traynor, supra note 79, at 663.
9
oSee, e.g., UNIFORM INrERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PRocEDURE Acr
§1.03(a)(5) and CPLR §302, both providing that personal jurisdiction
may be asserted as to causes of action arising out of the ownership, use,
or possession of real property.
91 See Developments it the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 909, 965-66 (1960).92 Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The Power
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 312-14 (1956). Professor
Ehrenzweig advocates jurisdiction solely on the basis of the convenient forum.
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The pressures and complexities of the twentieth century ques-
tion the significance of the individual in our modern society. Sheer
mathematics threatens the availability and protection of fundamental
rights and the "pursuit of happiness" means to many little more
than a fight for survival and recognition. The need is obvious, the
response is not. Yet, some progress has been made. The War
on Poverty is being fought on the battlegrounds of the nation's
ghettos to relieve the impoverished conditions of the slum dwell-
ers. The champions of this effort realize, however, that a neces-
sary avenue of approach for these socially underprivileged is
through the courts of law. Rights are of little consequence unless
enforceable. Consequently, the Office of Economic Opportunity'
(hereinafter cited as OEO), acting as central command in the War
on Poverty, has inaugurated a system of neighborhood law office
programs throughout the country to assist the indigent by provid-
ing free legal services and thereby making more readily available
judicial protection and relief.2
There remains, however, a substantially "unfilled need for
legal services." ' The OEO programs will at best serve only a
fraction of the population; so too with Legal Aid and Public
Defender programs; and Bar Association referral plans apparently
have not met with popular acceptance. For the majority, the prob-
lem of securing competent, reasonably-priced legal services has
become acute.4  To meet this need, the formation of group legal
1 Shriver, The ORO and Legal Services, 51 A.B.A.J. 1064 (1965). See
Legal Services and the War on Poverty, 13 CATHOLIc LAw. 272 (1967);
Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for
the Poor, 80 HARv. L. REv. 805 (1967).
2 With regard to these efforts in New York, see In re Community
Action For Legal Services, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779
(1st Dep't 1966), wherein a unanimous court, although recognizing the im-
portance of such programs, rejected three corporate charters of neighbor-
hood organizations to be financed under the OEO. The court found the
lay-controlled organization unworkable since it would not permit the court
sufficient control over the legal practice of the organizations. Similarly
offensive to the court was the obvious intermingling of social goals with
the practice of law. "Recognizing that the law may be a constructive pro-
gressive force in the development of a community, and particularly that
social goals involve significant lay leadership and lay individual engage-
ment, the interrelation of social goals with the practice of law still must
be better and even precisely defined, or if not definable, separated." Id. at
362, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
3 Report of Committee on Group Legal Services, 39 CAL. STATE B.J.
639, 652 (1964). See Enersen, Group Legal Services, 51 A.B.A.J. 1066
(1965).
4 Cheatham, A Lazwyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle
Classes, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 973 (1963). "[I]t is clear that a large amount
of legal services needed by the middle classes either is not rendered at all,
or is performed by laymen inexpert in the law and free from professional
control. . . ." Id. at 983.
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services plans was a logical step. Trade unions,5 associations a
and clubs 7 initiated programs through which they would either
hire attorneys or refer their members to attorneys selected by the
group to assist each member in his legal affairs. The reasoning
of these organizations cannot be questioned:
Why is it that individuals may band together to provide themselves
with cheaper insurance, cheaper groceries, higher wages, better prices,
easier credit, lower taxes, better health-everything except better or
cheaper legal advice and aid?"
The American Bar purports to answer this question. Al-
though acknowledging the need for increased availability of legal
services, the bar associations agree that the solution must be in
accord with the Canons of Professional Ethics.9 And brandishing
the Canons to any attorneys who would become involved with
group legal services programs and threatening disciplinary proceed-
ings, the bar associations contend that such group services programs
violate Canon 2710 (advertising and solicitation), Canon 28 11
(stirring up litigation), Canon 35 12 (intermediaries), and Canon
5 See, e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia
e.x rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
6See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Richmond Ass'n
of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n of City of Richmond, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E.
153 (1937).
7See, e.g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club,
362 II1. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935).
8 Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Non-Pecuniary Corporations: A
Social Utility, 2 U. Cx'. L. R¢. 119, 128 (1934). See generally Zimroth,
Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966 (1967).
9The Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted in 1908 by the
American Bar Association. These Canons have been adopted, in whole or
in substantial part, in the various states by rule of court, by act of legisla-
ture, or by bar association action. They are reprinted annually in 3
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, Prefatory Section. These Canons
are presently undergoing revision and tentative drafts are expected in the
near future.
10 "It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars,
advertisements, through touters or by personal communications or interviews
not warranted by personal relations."
11 "It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a law-
suit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make
it his duty to do so."
12"The Professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or
exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes be-
tween client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are
individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of
his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary."
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47 13 (aiding the unauthorized practice of law). The argument
concludes that such activities by these groups constitute an un-
authorized practice of law and contribute to an intolerable commer-
cialization of the profession.1
4
The public no doubt has lost confidence as a result of the
majority's proscription of group legal services. They hear from
the profession's own lips that their primary objective is to provide
legal services,15 but nonetheless, the need remains unfilled. They
fail, of course, to appreciate the crucial ethical traditions which
must be maintained if the profession is to remain a profession.
Yet, the crusade for group legal services has found a strong
proponent in the United States Supreme Court. In NAACP v.
Button,'0 the Court approved a plan whereby attorneys hired by
the Association would assist members in litigating various actions
involving civil rights. The plan drew first amendment protection
since, as the majority reasoned, it involved freedom of association
and petition to redress. One year later, the protection was extend-
ed to a labor union practice of referring its members to selected
attorneys.'7 And recently, the Court extended this rationale and
supported a union plan whereby attorneys hired by the union
would assist members in workmen's compensation claims.'"
Two things are certain: (1) certain group legal services are
here to stay; (2) the Supreme Court has not abrogated the Canons
to establish these services. The conclusion is simply that group
legal services can be provided without sacrificing the necessary
ethics of the legal profession. The two interests can and must
co-exist.
The problem becomes one of compromise. In the language
of the Court, at what point will the "balance" be struck in favor
of protecting the public from harms resulting from a breach of
professional ethics? The logic of the arguments pro and con is
destroyed by the assertion of extreme cases. This gulf is not
conducive to solution. The balance of this note will attempt to
23 "No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be
used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by
any lay agency, personal or corporate."
14 American Bar Association, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTicE NEWs 264 (1964).
It should be noted, however, that this position has met with considerable
opposition from various state bar associations. See, e.g., Report of Com-
mittee on Group Legal Services, supra note 3.
"5 H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHaIcs 5 (1953); R. POUND, THt LAWYER FROM
ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TImEs 5 (1953); Hewitt, Review of Codes of
Ethics, 35 YALE L.J. 391, 392-93 (1926).
10371 U.S. 415 (1963).
17 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar,
377 U.S. 1 (1964).
SUnited Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217 (1967).
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examine the arguments with an eye toward pinpointing where the
ethical standard for group legal services lies. It will not argue
extremes, but will propose possible methods of making group legal
services compatible with the interests expounded by the Canons of
Professional Ethics.
The Seven Deadly Sins of Group Legal Services
a) Maintenance, CIamperty, Barratry
The rules prohibiting maintenance (helping another prosecute
a suit), champerty (maintaining a suit in return for a financial
interest in the outcome), and barratry (a continuing practice of
maintenance or champerty) developed in early common law and
are today included in the penal laws of some jurisdictions. 0 Other
jurisdictions enforce the same principles indirectly through their
Canons of Professional Ethics. 20  Implementation of these rules is
particularly effective against group legal services since the group's
obvious purpose is ultimately to assist in the litigation of claims.
The early common law forbade a disinterested third party to
maintain suits in order to confuse or annoy political opponents
or foes. Almost immediately, however, exceptions developed. If
the maintainer proved that his motive was non-malicious or if the
outcome of the litigation was in his favor, he would not be pun-
ished. The evil to be curbed, therefore, was the abuse of legal
process. If the maintainer had not acted maliciously or if the




The firm establishment of this motive-outcome rationale was
delayed by the strong popular distaste for litigation. In feudal
times, litigation meant trial by battle or ordeal for the litigants.
2 2
Against this backdrop the question of merit to a particular claim
or sincerity in the heart of the maintainer was for all practical
purposes a moot question.
The limitation of this broad common-law proscription has been
an arduous process and not too surprising is the fact that rem-
nants of this attitude toward litigation are discernible today.
Initially, many courts tried to circumvent the indiscriminate appli-
cation of these rules by analyzing the relationship between the
19 .g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 158 (barratry).
20 In New York, for example, the offense of maintenance was deleted
in the 1967 revision of the Penal Law. Yet, although the criminal sanction
has been dropped, the same principle is enforced via Canons 28 and 30.
21 For a comprehensive historical discussion of these problems, see
P. WINFIELD, THE HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE
131-60 (1921).
22 See Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 48, 57-59
(1935).
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suitor and the maintainer. Extending the disinterested party ra-
tionale, the courts reasoned that if a relationship of master-servant,
landlord-tenant or blood relations existed, then the third party was
no longer disinterested and his activities in support of the litigation
were excused.2 3  Only when the inadequacies of these exceptions
became apparent did the courts begin to study the intent of the
maintainer rather than his act. In New York, for example, prior
to the recent revision of the Penal Law, the acts of maintenance
had to be done "with a corrupt or malicious intent to vex and
annoy." 24
At the core of this problem rests the classical distinction in
criminal law between an act considered malum in se (a wrong in
itself, i.e., inherently or essentially evil) and malum prohibitum
(an act is wrong because it is prohibited). " The former category
necessarily involves the element of intent; the latter category is
equivalent to strict liability since the prohibited act is wrong
regardless of the good faith or sincerity of the actor. This strict
liability concept developed in criminal law in response to substan-
tial public demand to curb a particular abuse. No balancing
mechanism between possible good or bad results was employed. If
such were the case, an intent-oriented mechanism would be neces-
sary to preserve the good and abolish the evil. In this area of
maintenance of litigation, the development of the prohibition with
its exceptions indicates clearly the potential for good. And when
applied to group legal services, this potential is increased markedly.
If this potential is to be exploited to the best interests of the
public, the motive of the alleged maintainer must become the prin-
cipal criterion for establishing his liability. Only then can the
broad prohibition be replaced without sacrificing either the inter-
ests of the public or the ethical standards of the legal profession.
As one commentator has already noted, the prohibition is "especially
ironic since certain groups are prevented from protecting the
oppressed in the name of a doctrine created to prevent oppression." 26
23This same concept has, of course, been retained in Canon 28 which
begins: "It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it
his duty to do so" (emphasis added). Two very common exceptions to the
rules forbidding maintenance and champerty are contingent fee contracts
and assignments of choses in action. See Zimroth, supra note 8, at 970.
See also Bucdey v. Service Transp. Corp., 277 App. Div. 224, 98 N.Y.S.2d
576 (1st Dep't 1950).
24N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1881, ch. 676, § 134. Compare People v. Bunder,
13 App. Div. 2d 253, 256, 215 N.Y.S.2d 791, 794 (1st Dep't 1961), with
Scott v. State, 53 Ga. App. 61, 65, 185 S.E. 131, 133 (1936).
25 BLACK's LAv DicrloAtRY 1112 (4th ed. 1957).
26 Zimroth, supra note 8, at 971.
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b) Advertising and Solicitation
The professional proscriptions against advertising and solicita-
tion originated in the parlors of the early English barristers. This
elite group worked together constantly in an atmosphere of fra-
ternity and cooperation. 27  To insure this communal system, rules
of etiquette were necessarily appropriate.
No doubt the operation of the Bar today is beyond comparison
with these early legal communities. Interestingly enough, however,
is the fact that despite the radical change in the scope of the pro-
fession today, these rules of etiquette have persisted and are rigidly
enforced via the Canons of Professional Ethics. Largely as a
result of the efforts of the bar associations, these Canons have
remained inviolate against the advancing pressures of competition
and commercialization. In the eye of the bar associations, new
dangers facing the profession provide more than adequate justifica-
tion for their retention. They urge that a permissive attitude
toward advertising and solicitation would give open ground to the
"ambulance chaser," incite litigation and generally result in a disas-
trous commercialization of the profession.28  Yet, the mere fact
that conditions have changed so much that the increasing demand
for legal services has apparently not been met necessitates a cau-
tious re-thinking of these principles if the profession is to fulfill
its sole objective-to serve the people.
The specifics of the problem require ground work analysis of
the particular organization with respect to its avowed purpose and
more importantly, the actual implementation of its legal services
program. If a group offers to its members free or cheaper legal
services, this in and of itself does not establish its propensity
toward unlawful solicitation and commercialization. Several ques-
tions have to be answered: (1) What is the purpose of the par-
ticular group; (2) How are the attorneys to be paid; (3) Who
is doing the solicitation; (4) What is the scope of the legal serv-
ices being made available?
The answer to the first question presents a basic formula in
evaluating group legal services. If the purpose of a particular
group is solely to provide legal services for its members, it neces-
sarily follows that such a group could be expected to more actively
solicit membership, viz., professional employment for its attorneys.
Conversely, where a group such as a labor union is designed to
27 H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcS 210 (1953). See Note, The Early History
of the Legal Profession, 18 BAYLOR L. Rv. 380, 387-89 (1966).
28 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS, No. 8 (1925).
See In re Weitz, 11 App. Div. 2d 76, 202 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1st Dep't 1960).
Canons 27 and 28 have been interpreted, however, to permit occasional,
gratuitous recommendations of attorneys. See, e.g., In re Seidman, 228
App. Div. 515, 240 N.Y.S. 592 (1st Dep't 1930).
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improve the general welfare of its members (salary, working con-
ditions, pension benefits, etc.), and legal services is only an added
inducement or offering, the chance of active solicitation of legal
employment is decisively lessened.
The second and third questions are closely related. If the
attorney is salaried by the organization and no additional remun-
eration is available to him based on the number of claims he
handles, the sincerity of any solicitation on his part would seem
beyond question. If, on the other hand, the profit motive is appar-
ent from the attorney's solicitations, there is no reason to fear the
framework of the group services as a deterrent to any disciplinary
proceedings. On the organizational level, the solicitation is not
usually the product of a profit motive. The organization consists
in effect of the members themselves and, as such, its primary drive
is naturally toward the mutual benefits derived rather than actual
cash return. Of course, if it should appear that a group is en-
deavoring to launch a profit-making enterprise by providing group
legal services at "bargain prices," the law should not hesitate to
strike down such an operation. Such a situation was undoubtedly
contemplated by the Bar when an agency clause was included in
Canon 27. The clause provided that improper solicitation could
be carried on through a "touter" (agent). This would in effect
make the attorney responsible for the solicitation of the organiza-
tion. Opponents of the group legal services, who refuse to accept
the distinction between properly and ill-motivated solicitation, accept
this clause as an open opportunity to discipline attorneys; yet, in
view of Canon 47, which would accomplish the same end, is it
not more reasonable to accept the distinction and conclude that
the agency clause of Canon 27 was directed at the possibility of
a sophisticated organizational set-up where attorneys would send
out district solicitors to "bring home the business"? 29
Probably the most effective way of curtailing the big-business
tendencies of group legal services is to limit the permissible scope
of such services. As long as the organization's legal department
confines itself to promoting the interests of the client in relation to
his membership, the opportunity to improperly solicit will be
lessened. If, on the other hand, a labor union, for example, in
addition to handling workmen's compensation and related matters,
branches off into areas of probate, criminal law and, in short,
handles any legal problem of its members, the opportunity for
abuse is unlimited.
Of those who admit that the indiscriminate prohibition against
solicitation is undependable and inaccurate, many still maintain that
29 Comment, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1502 (1963). "Once agents or runners
are introduced, the reaction of most courts has been that the solicitation is
especially objectionable because of the more systematic and flagrant com-
mercialism involved." Id. at 1505 (footnotes omitted).
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the measure is justified by the fact that it incites litigation. No
doubt it does. But we have hopefully dispelled the ancient attitude
that litigation is something evil in itself and permissible only as a
last resort. The courtroom and the hearing have long since replaced
the trial arena and the torture chamber, and litigation means to
many a welcomed relief from oppression and injustice.3 0
The threat of "commercialization" is tendered as the final
argument in favor of such broad proscriptions of advertising and
solicitation. "[F]urnishing, selling or exploiting . . . the legal
services of members of the bar is derogatory to the dignity and
self-respect of the profession, tends to lower the standards of pro-
fessional character and conduct and thus lessens the usefulness of
the profession to the public ... ." 31 To take issue with this pro-
fessional scruple is to invite criticism as to one's sincerity in com-
promising the dignity of the profession. Nevertheless, the argument
seemingly overlooks the needs of society for adequate legal services
while seriously compromising the ethics of the individual practi-
tioner. This is not meant to condone neon lighting and other forms
of gaudy advertising, but nevertheless, the fact remains that the
profession has been commercialized to a degree and yet continues
to perform well despite a sometimes sagging reputation. 32  If the
Bar is seriously concerned with their reputation, they should con-
sider the possibility that outlawing group legal services would do
more to injure its reputation than upholding the non-commercial
image would help it.33
c) Lay Intermediary, Corporate Practice and the Conflict of.
Interest
Undoubtedly the strongest surge of criticism of group legal
services plans emanates from the fact that the group-intermediary
exercises a varying degree of control over its attorneys, and con-
sequently jeopardizes the precious attorney-client relationship.3 4  It
is felt that where conflict arises between the interests of the client
and the group, the attorney, conscious that his own welfare is
perhaps in jeopardy, will forsake the well-being of his client and
3OSee generally Comment, Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in
the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 YALE L.J. 574 (1949).
31 ABA CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 8 (1925).
32 Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HoPsoN, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 199-271
(1967); Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles and Poultices-anmd Cores?, 5 LAw
& CONTE P. PROB. 104 (1938). Of course, elements of commercialization
and competition threaten the legal profession from outside as well. See, e.g.,
State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863 (1958); New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 28 App.
Div. 2d 161, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1st Dep't 1967).
33 Zimroth, supra note 8, at 981.
34 Informative Opinion A of 1950 of the ABA Committee on the Un-
authorized Practice of Law, 36 A.B.A.J. 677 (1950).
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concentrate his efforts on protecting the interests of the group.
Canon 35 a1 emphasizes that the lawyer's responsibilities are indivi-
dual and forbids any arrangement whereby his services are either
"controlled" or "exploited" by any lay agency. For these same
reasons, Section 495 of the New York Judiciary Law makes it a
misdemeanor for any corporation to practice law.36
The problem is no doubt a serious one. Nevertheless, one
must question the propriety of so broad an exclusion in light of
the well-established need for group legal services. The argument
against such services is based on a double premise: first, that there
is a conflict between the two interests, and secondly, that the
attorney will disregard his client's interest in favor of the group.
In regard to the first, the scope of the group's activities are again
of crucial importance. The more diversified the interests of the
group, the greater the possibility of conflict. In actual operation,
however, the majority of group legal services programs have been
offered by labor unions. One aspect largely peculiar to these unions
is that the compelling reason behind an individual's membership is
the unanimity of purpose between the union and the individual
member. The members are the union. The chance for a serious
conflict of interest here is remote. But even the slightest pos-
sibility is a serious one. And when a different type of organization
is offering the service the chances are decidedly increased. For
example, a popular challenge to the NAACP program focuses upon
a Negro man who has been found guilty of murder and now faces
the death penalty. On appeal, his conviction might easily be
reversed because of a search and seizure violation. Yet the organ-
ization might best be served if his attorney were successful in
securing a reversal on the more tenuous grounds of equal pro-
tection.
35 It is interesting to note the charitable exclusion clause incorporated
into the Canon: "Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigents are
not deemed such intermediaries." It seems more reasonable to expect such
an exception in Canons 27 and 28 since the evils of solicitation and adver-
tising therein proscribed are less likely to manifest themselves within the
charitable structure. Yet, on the other hand, there seems to be no cor-
responding reason to substantiate the exclusion in the Intermediary-Canon.
Considering the energetic zeal and dedication distinctly evident in many
charitable groups, the evils of conflict and control over the attorney by the
organization are by no means minimized.
3 Another utilization of the corporate form as a weapon to threaten the
progress of group legal services was attempted by the Virginia Bar in
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), wherein it was argued that the
NAACP lacked standing to challenge the Canon and statutes involved. To
this assertion the Court swiftly replied: "we think petitioner may assert
this right on its own behalf, because, though a corporation, it is directly
engaged in those activities, claimed to be constitutionally protected, which
the statute would curtail." Id. at 428.
198
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
This situation demands questioning of the second premise, i.e.,
the attorney will disregard his client's interests in favor of the
group. The above portrayal is perhaps more dramatic than real.
As one commentator has pointed out, a casual reading of NAACP
briefs will clearly demonstrate that the client's interests are not
surrendered to the group's need for a particular rationale."7
Whether this explanation is sufficient to satisfy the opponents of
group legal services is highly doubtful. However, one incontrovertible
fact is apparent. Whether a lawyer allows the attorney-client
relationship to disintegrate at all or whether he favors the interest
of the group when in conflict with his client's, depends not on the
mechanism of the group services program which produced the
client, but rather on his own personal convictions and professional
responsibility. 38
The problems of control and conflict of interest are certainly
not indigenous to group legal services plans. For example, the
insurance company attorney owes a divided allegiance to his clients
and his employer. Consideration also should be given to the small
town attorney who has enthusiastically supported firearms control
legislation and one day finds himself defending a man in a civil
action who has negligently shot someone in a hunting accident.
Plainly, the area of possible conflict encompasses far more than
the relatively small activities of group legal services. And in all
cases it is the character of the attorney that will be the pivotal
factor. The Canons of Professional Ethics must extract from every
attorney the highest degree of personal conviction possible. But
they must not do so at the expense of group legal services.
One optimistic note concerning the future of group legal
services was offered by Professor Drinker in 1953:
It is not believed that the Canon [35] will prevent the labor unions
from finding lawyers to advise their members. The whole modern
tendency is in favor of such arrangements, including particularly em-
ployer and cooperative health services, the principles of which, if applied
to legal services would materially lower and spread the total cost to
the lower income groups.3 9
Professor Drinker then concludes with a rather sour note which
seems to indicate that Canon 35 (as well as the above mentioned
related Canons) has failed to uphold the high level of integrity
they were designed to insure. The very presence of such a sug-
gestion necessitates revision. He concludes: "The real argument
against their [group legal services] approval by the bar is believed
3 Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966.
976 (1967).
38 See Note, Group Legal Services, 79 HARv. L. REv. 416, 422 (1965).
39 H. DRINKER, supra note 27, at 167.
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to be loss of income to the lawyers and concentration of service in
hands of fewer lawyers. These features do not commend the
profession to the public." 40
The Constitutional Approach
Until relatively recently, cries for revision of the Canons in
favor of the acceptance of group legal services fell on deaf ears.
Varieties of group plans were regularly struck down in most juris-
dictions almost without exception.4 1 The decision in NAACP v.
Button 4 2 marked a decisive turning point in the crusade for group
legal services. The Association brought suit to enjoin the opera-
tion of a Virginia statute which, as amended, extended the State
laws against maintenance and solicitation to any agent who retained
an attorney in connection with the prosecution of any lawsuit in
which it was not a party nor had any potential pecuniary interest
or liability.4
3
The Association maintained a legal staff of fifteen men-iber
attorneys who would assist other members in establishing or pro-
tecting their civil rights. The successful implementation of this
plan was clearly dependent upon active solicitation of the "right
kind" of matters dealing with civil rights. Through speeches, cir-
culars and extensive personal contact, the Association would advise
its members of their rights and appraise them of the readily avail-
able avenue of remedy through the courts. If successful in solicit-
ing the litigation, the Association would provide a staff attorney
and pay him on a daily basis.
The program of the Association clearly came within the ambit
of the statutory prohibition. Nevertheless, the Court held that the
activities of the Association, its members and legal staff involved
the freedom of expression and association as guaranteed by the
first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution.44  These basic
freedoms could not be infringed by the Virginia statute's attempt
40 d.
4t See In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); Hildebrand v.
State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950) ; People ex rel. Chicago
Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935); People
ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187
N.E. 823 (1933); In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15(1910); Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327,
189 S.E. 153 (1937). But see Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App.
364 (1932).
42 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
43 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 (1956). See also Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D.
Va. 1958); NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960).
See generally Murphy, The South Counter-attacks: The Anti-NAACP
Laws, 12 W. Por. Q. 371 (1959).
44371 U.S. at 428-29. See Comment, 63 CoLUmn. L, REv, 1502 (1963).
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to regulate the legal profession. In answer to the charge that the
NAACP was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by their
unethical solicitation, the Court interjected the traditional "balanc-
ing test" between the interest of the public in upholding the stand-
ards of the profession and the interest of the individual litigants
whose freedom of expression was in jeopardy. The Court was
quick to emphasize that "[m]alicious intent was of the essence of
the common-law offenses of fomenting or stirring up litigation,"
and that such an element was not discernible in the NAACP plan.
45
It was then concluded that the state had "failed to advance any
substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils
flowing from petitioner's activities, which can justify the broad
prohibitions which it has imposed." 41
As welcomed as the Button rationale was to the crusade for
group legal services, it did present a problem. The relatively
uncrthodox atmosphere which served as the background for the
Button decision did not lend itself to easy comparison with the
more common group plans offered by labor unions and other simi-
lar groups. Many concluded that the Button holding was a mere
"product of the times," which, by protecting a form of timely polit-
ical expression, served as an encouraging boost to the country's
newly organized civil rights movement. At the, crux of the problem
was the fact that no precise evaluation of the C6urt's holding was
readily possible. Some activity was protected by the first amend-
ment, but the extent of the protection was uncertain. Was the
entire NAACP program of soliciting suits and recommending staff
attorneys to their members to be protected?4 7  Was solicitation,
once considered unethical, now a matter of constitutional right?
Perhaps the actual litigation was the protected activity? The
tenor of the majority's decision apparently substantiated the latter
conclusion. The Court acknowledged the fact that the ancient
attitudes regarding litigation, i.e., that it was a necessary evil to
be avoided whenever possible, had long since given way to an
appreciation of the benefits litigation can secure. For the members
of the NAACP, litigation was perhaps their only means of effective
expression. If this were an accurate appraisal of the Button
4 371 U.S. at 439. "Resort to the courts to seek vindication of constitu-
tional rights is'a different matter from the oppressive, malicious, or avari-
cious use of the legal process for purely private gain." Id. at 443.
46371 U.S. at 444. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan asserted
that the conduct protected by the majority's decision is not speech alone, but
rather invades the sphere of conduct where "the area of legitimate govern-
mental interest expands." Id. at 454.
47 See Zimroth, supra note 37, at 985-88. Consider Mr. Justice White's
concurring opinion wherein he stated what appeared to him to be the activity
protected: "advising Negroes of their constitutional rights, urging them to
institute litigation of a particular kind, recommending particular lawyers and
financing such litigation." 371. U.S. at 447.
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premise, the reasoning would follow thusly: to organize to solicit
and sponsor litigation is not a matter of constitutional right and it
may be regulated as long as such regulations do not impede the
actual purpose of the organization-to advance rights of individuals
through litigation. The right to litigate itself is a matter of con-
stitutional right and as such cannot be regulated unless the state
advances a substantial regulatory interest sufficient to upset the
balance in favor of protection.
The search for the Button standard appears futile in light of
two seemingly contradictory statements by the Court. Speaking
for the majority of the Court, Mr. justice Brennan was quick to
point out that group legal services generally were not being
judged.4S  Yet, he also seemed to indicate that what the Court
did in Button would affect the application of all the rules of legal
ethics to group legal services.4 9
Probably the most significant advance for group services came
one year after Button in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar.50 While this second Supreme
Court decision also fell far short of establishing any workable
standard, it did highlight a trend which the courts, in analyzing
group legal services, would hopefully follow.
The plan employed by the Brotherhood was basically a referral
plan."' Injured members and their families would be contacted by
a representative of the association's Department of Legal Counsel,
advised against making any settlement before consulting with an
attorney, and finally the member would be referred to a specific
attorney chosen by the Brotherhood for his honesty and skill in
railroad personal injury litigation.5 2 The Virginia State Bar was
48371 U.S. at 441-42. See Markus, Group Representation by Attomeys as
Misconduct, 14 CLzv.-MAR. L. REv. 1, 13 (1965).
40 371 U.S. at 429 n.11.
50377 U.S. 1 (1964). See generally 40 No=rn DAME LAw. 447 (1965).
52 This was not the first time such a plan was before the courts. See
Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 503 (1950); In re
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958); Hulse
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1960). But see
Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950) (Carter, J.,
dissenting) (Traynor, J., dissenting). Here strong dissents concluded that
the Brotherhood's plan did not lower the dignity of the profession, but rather
consisted of "nothing more than a proper joining of forces for the accom-
plishment of a proper legal objective of mutual protection." Id. at 516, 225
P.2d at 515.
52Under the Brotherhood's plan, the country was divided into sixteen
regions under the direction of the Department of Legal Counsel. With the
advice of local lawyers and judges the Brotherhood would select a lawyer
or firm with a reputation for honesty and skill in the area of workmen's
compensation. The union also provided at their own expense a staff to
investigate claims and gather evidence to be made available to the injured
workman. See Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case for BRT, 12
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 306, 310-11 (1965).
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successful in enjoining the operation of the plan which was shown
to constitute unlawful solicitation and the unauthorized practice of
law. The Brotherhood admitted that the result of the plan was
to channel legal employment to the particular attorneys, but none-
theless contended that the injunction operated to deny them free-
dom of speech, petition and assembly. The Court agreed, asserting
that these first amendment freedoms gave the members the right
to gather together for effective assertion of their collective rights.
Although reputed as the Court's first amendment "absolutist," Mr.
Justice Black showed no hesitation in subscribing to the balancing
test rationale of Button when he observed that "the State again has
failed to show any appreciable public interest in preventing the
Brotherhood from carrying out its plan. . .. ," 53 The Court con-
cluded by asserting that the Constitution protected the associational
rights of the Brotherhood precisely as it does that of the NAACP.
In a rather spirited dissent, Mr. Justice Clark repudiated the
Court's reliance on the Button decision asserting that there the
NAACP strove to protect a "form of political expression," made
to secure constitutionally protected civil rights.54  No such civil
rights were involved in the Brotherhood decision. He argued that
the substitution of pecuniary gain as the motive of the association's
activities presented an enormous potential for evil which would
bring disrepute to the profession.
It would seem that the majority attempted to lessen the gulf
created by the factual disparity of the two cases by emphasizing
that the rights the Brotherhood sought to protect were "authorized
by Congress to effectuate a basic public interest."55 By so desig-
nating the Brotherhood's interests, the Court apparently wished to
give added prestige to the union's mission with the hope of
analogizing its function to the "fundamental freedoms" sought by
the NAACP.
53 377 U.S. at 8.
.4 Id. at 10 (dissenting opinion). In answer to Mr. Justice Clark's at-
tempted distinction, one must consider first the majority's statement: "The
Constitution protects the associational rights of the members of the union
precisely as it does those of the NAACP." Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
Secondly, one must consider the statement of the Court in the United Mine
Workers decision (infra) wherein it was said: "[T]he First Amendment
does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be charac-
terized as political. . . . And the rights of free speech and a free press are
not confined to any field of human interest." 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
It would appear that these two statements underscore the difficulty of ascer-
taining precisely what activity was protected by the three decisions, i.e., the
right to associate or the right to free speech through litigation.
55 Id. at 7. See United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 224 n.5 (1967).
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Despite the Congressional endorsement of these rights so pre-
cious to the Brotherhood, 6 it appears that the popular surprise
over the Court's acceptance of the union's plan "in light of Button'"
was well warranted. The Brotherhood case, like its immediate
predecessor, provided no standards with which to evaluate various
group plans, and the applicability of the Canons to these prob-
lems was still very much in question. However, in light of the
fact that the Court in these cases has emphasized the protected
right of members to associate to secure common rights, it would
seem that the logical extension of this protection left little room
for the ethical checks the Canons were by design meant to insure.
Consequently, the decision weathered serious criticism from the Bar,
much of which was unfortunately misinterpreted by laymen."
The most recent Supreme Court endorsement of a group plan
can be found in United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State
Bar Association.58 The particular plan employed by the union
combined aspects found in both the NAACP's program and that
of the Brotherhood. The UMWA employed attorneys to assist its
members in claims arising out of the state's Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law. In vacating the Illinois decree which enjoined the union
from carrying on these activities on the ground that it constituted
the unauthorized practice of law, the Court held that the first and
fourteenth amendments gave the union the right to hire attorneys
on a salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of their
rights. Mr. Justice Black, again writing for the majority, noted
that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances is inseparably connected in origin and purpose with
the first amendment rights of free speech and free press.5 9
In so holding, the Court had to contend with the arguments
advanced by the Illinois Bar and accepted by that State's highest
court., As might be expected, the Illinois court easily distin-
guished the Button holding on the ground that that decision was
limited to sanctioning a form of political expression. In answer
to this contention, Mr. Justice Black aptly replied that "the First
Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the
extent it can be characterized as political. 'Great secular causes,
56376 U.S. at 5-6 (recognized in the Federal Employers' Liability Act
and the Safety Appliance Act).
5 See Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Non-Pecuniary Corporations: A
Social Utility, 2 U. CHr. L. RFv. 119, 123 (1933). See generally Blaustein,
What Do Laynei, Think of Lawyers? Polls Show the Need for Better
Public Relations, 38 A.B.A.J. 39 (1952).
5s339 U.S. 217 (1967).
501d. at 222.
6035 Ill. 2d 112, 219 N.E.2d 503 (1966). See 65 MIcH. L. Rav. 805
(1967).
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with small ones, are guarded .... And the rights of free speech
and a free press are not confined to any field of human interest.' "61
In distinguishing the Brotherhood case, the Illinois Bar argued
that because the UMWA plan called for attorneys employed by
the union, the possibility of control was appreciably greater than
with the Brotherhood's referral system, and consequently, the
temptation to sacrifice the client's interest was accordingly stronger.
The Court rejected this argument, noting that in boti situations
the economic welfare of the attorneys was dependent upon the
good will of the union, "and if the temptation to sacrifice the
client's best interests is stronger in the present situation, it is
stronger to a virtually imperceptible degree." 62
In applying the balancing rationale to this third plan, the
Court studied several aspects of the plan in an effort to gauge the
extent of possible conflict. The attorney's contracts for employ-
ment explicitly disclaimed any control by the union over the
attorney and emphasized the obligations presented by the attorney-
client relationship. s The individual members were under no obliga-
tion to accept the union counsel and, once accepted, the client
made all decisions regarding settlement offers and pending litiga-
tion. Moreover, any resulting settlements or awards were paid
directly and entirely to the client. Finally, the Court was not
deterred by the fact that the rather routine processing of work-
men's compensation cases did not really require the attorneys to
give their personal attention to each client. The important fact,
as the Court pointed out, was that the attorneys were available for
conferences with their clients should a particular situation war-
rant. After reviewing the entire plan, the Court did not reject
the theoretical possibility of conflicts or abuse, but emphasized
that in the many years the UMWA plan had been in operation,
they were unaware of "one single instance" of abuse or conflicting
interests. They concluded that these rather speculative dangers
certainly did not warrant the broad proscriptions leveled by the
Canons of Professional Ethics.
64
81389 U.S. at 223, citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
62389 U.S. at 224. As the Court pointed out, it is interesting to note
that although the Illinois Supreme Court considered the possibility of con-
flict as at best "conceivable," it declared that any financial connection be-
tween the union and the attorneys was illegal. 35 Ill. 2d 112, 118, 219
N.E.2d 503, 506 (1966), quoting In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).63 389 U.S. at 220-21.
14 The lone dissenter, Mr. Justice Harlan, renewed his position previously
taken in Button, wherein he agreed with the Court's use of the '"alancing"
approach, but took issue as to its exact application. He asserted that the
activity protected was not purely speech, but rather came within the sphere





Having reviewed the constitutional development of group legal
services up to the present, one question must predominate: what
generally is the status of group legal services today? The Button-
Brotherhood-United Mine trilogy evidences the Supreme Court's
determination to discard the Canon's indiscriminate prohibition of
all group legal services plans. Yet, considering the many forms
group legal services plans may take, the trilogy's relatively limited
sphere of application makes any general conclusion impossible. Even
within this factual sphere, the Court is obviously delinquent in
setting standards for the three groups to follow which could then
be made analogous to group legal services in general. The only
alternative available to establish basic criteria for group services
in general seems to necessitate extracting from the three plans
factors common to all with the hope that some standards would
then appear discernible.
All three plans provided legal services to the members as an
additional feature or part of the overall services. In other words,
the organization did not exist solely to provide group legal services.
In each case the legal aid was available to enforce or protect
rights realized as a result of membership. None of the plans in
any way jeopardized the attorney-client relationship, i.e.,, each
client had his own attorney who was made readily available to
him. Each plan allowed the members absolute freedom to choose
his attorney (union or non-union) and to make all decisions con-
cerning his claim. And finally, no specific instances of actual con-
flict or abuse were apparent from the operation of the three
programs.
Can we use these common factors to develop general evaluat-
ing criteria for group legal services? It is highly doubtful. A
requirement that group plans be offered by organizations as an
added feature only ignores the fact that the contribution of charit-
able legal aid programs, such as Legal Aid or similar plans or-
ganized under the OEO, has already been recognized. There is
no reason why such "sole-purpose" plans have to be exclusively
charitable. Could not a legal insurance program be implemented
with enough safeguards so as to secure its beneficial performance?
Could not the UMWA be permitted to offer its members legal
services beyond the confines of workmen's compensation? Clearly,
if we adopt the factors common to the three decisions as standards,
these questions could not even be asked, much less answered. We
are still without standards. An interesting question now arises.
Could not the Supreme Court challenge the Bar for the same lack
of standards? The Court might argue that the standards for de-
termining breaches of the Canons of Ethics have become inappro-
priate and impervious to the developing needs of society.
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Our canons of ethics for the most part are generalizations designed
for an earlier era. However undesirable the practices condemned, they
do not profoundly affect the social order outside our own group. We
must not permit our attention to the relatively inconsequential to divert
us from preparing to set appropriate standards for those who design
the legal patterns for business practices of far more consequence to
society than any with which our grievance committees have been
preoccupied.6 5
It appears now that perhaps the Court's omission of stand-
ards was deliberate. By so doing the Court will hopefully force
the hand of the Bar Associations to set their own standards. The
Bar would undoubtedly be better off to concede this battle lost
and align itself with the ideal of providing maximum services to
the public while insuring the maintenance of strict ethical stand-
ards. In the past, the Bar's zeal has resulted in not only pro-
scribing particular undesirable conduct, but also in eliminating
any possible opportunity for such conduct to arise. It must now
concentrate specifically on the evil to be curbed, thinking in terms
of motive rather than act, of actual abuse rather than potential
abuse.
There is no alternative. If left to follow the rationale de-
veloped in the Button trilogy, the broad prohibitions of the Canons
could entirely fall victim to the same force that, endorsed the three
plans. The three endorsements given group legal services will
undoubtedly lead to considerable development of a variety of plans.
These "planners" will be looking for guidance as to what services
they can offer. The American Bar cannot afford to refuse this
guidance. For unless strict ethical standards are rejuvenated and
made applicable to group legal services through revision, it is
doubtful whether any extension of the availability of legal services
can properly satisfy this serious, unfilled need.
65 Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HAgv. L. REv. 1, 10 (1934).
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